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ABSTRACT
The background to this research is based on the considerable debate as to whether there will ever
be one international currency, one “business” language spoken or one set of accounting
standards applicable to all businesses listed in various countries stock exchanges. Governance
principles are no different! Is it possible to create one set of rules or principles to guide all
businesses across borders? This research compares the governance standards and regimes across
the globe, from China, to the Nordic region (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland & Finland),
Europe, Asia-Pacific (New Zealand, Australia) and the United States of America. Using archival
data, governance codes from around the world are compared and contrasted. The findings show
that across borders governance codes are very similar, with the opportunity to create a Global
Governance Standard (GGS), applicable to any business in any country. The Global Governance
Standard (GGS) is a one-size-fits-all regime applicable to businesses listing on stock exchanges.
The GGS is not unlike the harmonisation of accounting standards. The “one-size-fits-all” GGS
could potentially apply to any large business, listed on any stock exchange, creating efficiencies
and ease of comparison for potential stakeholders interested in businesses. The “BOARDSS”
model can be used by listed companies, in order to satisfy corporate governance codes from
across the globe. Board: to ensure the board are selected carefully. Open: The make sure that the
board is transparent and accountable. Auditor Independence: ensure accounts are audited by an
independent auditor. Remuneration: the CEO and executive staff are reviewed, and supported
by a smaller remuneration committee. Directors are selected for their ability to “add-value” to
the strategic direction of the company, and the support of the CEO. Directors’ performance
should be reviewed annually. Reducing the labyrinth of governance codes to just one GGS would
create a uniform approach to governance, supported by government and stock exchanges around
the world. A GGS would be the final evolution in the notion of governance since the codes of
conduct of Hammurabi of 1800 BC. Let the borders be gone, and the Global Governance
Standard (GGS) left standing as the final chapter in governance evolution.
JEL Classifications: G38, M16, O16
Keywords: Global Governance Standards, BOARDSS model, Corporate Governance.
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION IN LITERATURE
The World Bank defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms available to
shareholders for influencing managers to maximize the value of shareholder’s stock
and to fixed claimants for controlling the agency costs of equity. Likewise, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines corporate
governance as ‘a set of relationships among management, company board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders’. Both definitions imply the principal-agent model
of the corporation, and emphasise the importance of shareholder interest and company
value. Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as ‘a set of

426

mechanisms to assure financiers that they will get a return on their investment’. But
can there be a governance regime that stands up to a borderless application in this
borderless business operating system?
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Gubernare and gubernator, the roots of ‘governance’ refer to the steering of a ship
(Farrar, 2001). By analogy, this steersmanship is aligned to the methods of ethically
controlling and directing the affairs of corporate entities. In the contemporary
corporate setting the Latin steersmanship notion of an entity is akin to the idea of
matters being shipshape.
The issue of business governance dates as far back as 1800BC to the Code of
Hammurabi, (Werhane, 2000) that controlled the ethics of traders and merchants. Such
fathers of modern economic doctrine as Smith (1776) and Spencer (1862) contributed
to the current understanding of corporate governance by defining the links between
ethics and economics which encourage management to become accountable for their
actions, through the use of standardised preparation of accounts, audited to satisfy
users (especially shareholders) of the absence of fraud.
Williston (1908) describes the modern corporation evolving from a
relationship of government and industry surviving through a combination of capital
and mutual co-operation. The advent of the 1800s corporation and its increase in size
and importance is crucial to infrastructure development, and as such is a societal good.
This reasoning is extended by Carlos and Nicholas (1988) to include the advent of the
multinational through the nineteenth century developing from the experience and use
of domestic and cross-border level production facilities. The UK Companies Act of
1844 was a mechanism of that facilitated the separation of ownership and control and
yet intended to make managers accountable to the shareholders and investment in joint
stock companies an acceptable risk.
Anglo-American corporate governance is almost completely focused on the
means of enhancing and protecting shareholders’ value (Siebens, 2002), derived from
an increase in transactions within a framework in which owner-managers are replaced
by salaried managers (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988). Classical economists such as Smith
(1776) and corporate observers such as Berle & Means (1932) perceived the dangers
inherent in the separation of ownership (principal) and control (agent) regarding
managers’ actions. Drawing upon their analysis of the behaviour of US corporations
in the World War 1 period following the trust movement engineered by the robberbarons, Berle & Means (1932) realised the growing power of the organisation, and the
inevitable separation of managerial power between executive management and their
diverse range of shareholders – a theme pursued in the modern setting by Jenson &
Meckling (1976) in their discussion of the concept of the agency costs of monitoring
the behaviour of potentially errant opportunistic managers (Clarke, Dean & Oliver,
2003) not always acting in the best interests of their owner principles.
Although Adam Smith did not use the term ‘corporate governance’ directly,
he was aware of the implications. “The directors of companies, being managers of
other people’s money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own” (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 1776).
Governance steersmanship then, is necessary for corporate entities, nation
states, associations, clubs, and societies to function legitimately and efficiently for the
benefit of those for whose wellbeing they are argued to have been created.
Management is concerned with organising, planning, controlling, and leading
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organisations with limited resources to achieve goals (Robbins, Bergman, Stagg &
Coulter, 2000). But governance also involves the limitation of powers to control and
direct, and regulate organisations (Tricker, 1984).
The interest in corporate governance for corporations seems to have peeked
over the last twenty years (Oman 2001, Lin 2001, Goswani, 2001, Malherbe & Segal
2001, Arun & Turner, 2004). Large corporations appear to have recognised the wisdom
of complying with the governance regimes currently in fashion. “The logic is simple:
poor corporate governance is viewed as risky, whereas creditors and investors view
good governance as a sign of strength in a company” (Lee, 2001, p.24). It is thus no
surprise that the Horwarth 2004 Report (Psaros & Seamer, 2004, p.1) showed that since
2003 the top 250 listed corporations in Australia had ticked more boxes annually to
imply “improved disclosures in relation to code of conduct, & risk management”.
Following this, “a good governance structure is then one that selects the most able
managers and makes them accountable to investors” (Tirole, 2001 p.2).
MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES
Corporate governance is the system that controls and directs organisations (Cowan,
2004). ‘Good’, effective corporate governance ensures organisations set appropriate
objectives, have in place systems and structures to meet these objectives, and the means
to control and monitor their activities and managers (OECD, 2015). According to the
OECD corporate governance is explained as follows:
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation … and lays down
the rules and procedures for decision-making. By doing this, it also provides the
structure through which the company objectives are set, and means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance.
Corporate governance rules are required because of the nature in which
organisations are structured. With the exception of small family operated businesses,
the people that contribute the resources to the business (capital investors, shareholders
or lenders) do not directly manage the business (the separation of ownership from
operational control). The corporate governance framework is primarily concerned with
managing this relationship (Rankin, Stanton, McGowan, Ferlauto & Tilling, 2012).
In 1999 (later revised in 2004), the OECD developed a Corporate Governance
Framework, consisting of six principles (see Table 1 below). These “principles are
intended to help policy makers evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory, and
institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to support economic
efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability” (OECD, 2015, p.9). These
principles “represent a common basis that OECD member countries consider essential
for the development of good governance practices” (OECD, 2004). Both member and
non-member countries of the OECD were explicitly invited to use these corporate
governance principles to improve their regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks
(Tsui, 2010).
TABLE 1: OECD’S SIX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
I
II
III

Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework
The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership
functions
Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries
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IV
V
VI

The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
Disclosure and transparency
The responsibilities of the board

Source: OECD, 2015
Countries have established rules or descriptions of practices “that should be
included in corporate governance systems” that form either recommendations or legal
requirements. In Australia the ASX (Australian Stock Exchange) has set out
corporate governance principles and recommendations for listed entities. However,
the ASX recognises that there are a number of factors that differ between these
entities including their: history, size, culture and complexity; and thus “[they] may
legitimately adopt different governance practices” (ASX Corporate Governance
Council, 2014). Therefore, these principles and recommendations are not mandatory.
TABLE 2: ASX’S EIGHT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Governance Principles
1
Lay solid foundations for management and oversight.
2
Structure and board to add value
3
Promote ethical and responsible decision making
4
Safeguard integrity in financial reporting
5
Make timely disclosure
6
Respect the rights of shareholders
7
Recognise and manage risk
8
Remunerate fairly and responsibly
Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014
Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies in China sets ‘the basic
principles for corporate governance of listed companies …, the means for the
protection of investors’ interests and rights, the basic behaviour rules and moral
standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members
of listed companies” (CSRC, 2003).
TABLE 3: CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR LISTED
COMPANIES IN CHINA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholder’s Meetings
Chapter 2. Listed Company and its controlling shareholders
Chapter 3. Directors and Board of Directors
Chapter 4. The supervisors and the supervisory board
Chapter 5. Performance assessments and incentive and disciplinary systems
Chapter 6. Stakeholders
Chapter 7. Information disclosure and Transparency

Source: CSRC, 2003
UK Corporate Governance Code (formally known as the combined code)
“sets out standards of good practice in relation to board leadership and effectiveness,
remuneration, accountability and relations with shareholders” (Financial Reporting
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Council, 2014). It comprises broad principles and specific provisions, which listed
companies, are required to report on in their annual report.
TABLE 4: UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
A
B
C
D

Section A: Leadership
Section B: Effectiveness
Section C: Accountability
Section D: Remuneration

E

Section E: Relations with shareholders

Source: Financial Reporting Council, 2014
The Sarbanes-Oxley United States of America Act of 2002 is mandatory for
all organisations. This Act “introduced major changes to the regulation of financial
practice and corporate governance” (The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 2006).
TABLE 5: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
1. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
2. Auditor Independence
3.Corporate Responsibility
4.Enhanced Financial Disclosures
5. Conflicts of Interest
6.Commission Resources and Authority
7.Studies and Reports
8.Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
9.White-collar crime penalty enhancements
10.Corporate tax returns
11.Corporate Fraud and Accountability
Source: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 2002
In New Zealand the Securities Commission released the Corporate
Governance in New Zealand Principles and Guidelines (CGNZ, 2004) which are to be
applied by entities which have an economic impact and are accountable to the public
– clearly including listed and other issuers, state owned enterprises, community trusts
and public sector entities. The guidelines recognise that “different types of entities can
take different approaches to achieving consistently high standards of corporate
governance” (CGNZ, 2004, p.3).
TABLE 6: NEW ZEALAND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
Governance Principle
Principle 1
Principle 2
Principle 3
Principle 4
Principle 5
Principle 6

Recommendation
Ethical Standards
Board composition and performance
Board Committees
Reporting and disclosure
Remuneration
Risk Management
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Principle 7
Principle 8
Principle 9

Auditors
Shareholder Relations
Stakeholder interests

Source: CGNZ, 2004
The Nordic region too was also inventing their own governance regimes with each
country initiating their own regimes as shown in table 7.
TABLE 7 GOVERNANCE REGIMES OF THE NORDIC REGION
Swedish CG
(2005)
Shareholders
Meeting

Denmark CG
(2005)
Shareholders

Norway CG
(2006)
CG Reporting

Iceland CG
(2005)
Board of
Directors

Finland CG
(2003)
General
Meetings

Board
Appointment

Stakeholders

Business

Audit
committee

Supervisory
Board

Board of
Directors

Transparency

Equity and
Dividends

Remuneration
Committee

Board

Company
Management

Supervisory
Board x2

Shareholders

Board
Committees

CG
Information

Remuneration

Shares

Managing
Director

Risk Manage

General
Meetings

Other
Management

Audit

Nomination Com
Directors

Compensation
Risk
Management

Directors Work

Administration

Risk
Management

Audit

Remuneration x2

Communication

Communication
Take-overs
Audit

However, these have since been updated with Sweden issuing new codes in
2015 and a combined “Nordic Code” in 2009 as shown in table 8.
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TABLE 8: NORDIC AND SWEDISH GOVERNANCE CODES
Nordic Corporate Governance
(2009)
Strong general meeting powers
Shares with multiple voting rights

Swedish Corporate Governance
(2010)
Shareholders Meeting
Appointment and remuneration of
Board, auditor
The tasks of the board of directors
Size and composition of the Board
The tasks of directors
The chair of the Board
Board Procedures

Strong minority protection
Effective individual shareholder rights
Non-executive Boards
Use of Board Committees
Auditors appointed by and accountable
to shareholders
Active governance role of major
shareholders
Transparency

Evaluation of the board and CEO
Remuneration of the Board and
executive management
Information of corporate governance

Source: The working group of the self-regulatory corporate governance bodies of the
5 Nordic countries, 2009; Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2010
By now comparing each of the regimes we can combine them to see the
differences and similarities as shown in table 10. The Table shows that each of the
regimes is a set of protective principles designed to protect the interests of absentee
(non -management participating) shareholders. It shows a variety of combinations
and that in itself shows the lack of consistency when designing and applying
corporate governance initiatives.
Also outlined are the principles in terms of their comparison of use in the
seven different governance mechanisms. These comparisons show a variation in what
is considered the applicable corporate governance mechanisms in different countries
and regions, for different organisations. It is interesting to note that SOX appears to be
centred on penalties to prevent fraud, whereas the ASXGCG is the only organisation
to mention risk and ethics. This is more likely a reflection of the current differences in
the huge amount of litigation occurring in the US, and the Australian attempt to prevent
litigation by introducing risk management and ethics.
TABLE 9: COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS
Regimes of
‘protective’
Principles
Governance
Framework
Shareholder
Importance
Disclosure &
Transparency
Board’s
Responsibilities

China

Nordic
Regions

New
Zealand

OECD









x3

x3











US

UK

AUS







x2















x2
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Directors’
Performance
Remuneration
Auditor
Independence
Conflicts of
Interest
Company
Oversight Board
Corporate Fraud
Penalties &
Sentencing
Ethical
Decisions
Risk
Management
Stakeholders































































































































Arguably, the analysis in Table 9 suggests that a case can be mounted to the effect
that of the regimes listed, 7 prove to be the most popular and useful being: Shareholder
Importance, Disclosure and transparency, Board Responsibilities, Directors
performance, Remuneration, Auditor Independence & Stakeholders. We can then
convert these into 7 global standards and use the acronym “BOARDSS”, creating the
governance standard shown in figure 1:

433
FIGURE 1: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STANDARDS (GGS)

Global Governance
Standards (GGS)
(BOARDSS)

Board

Open

Auditor
Independence

Remuneration

Directors

Shareholders
and
Stakeholders

Board: to ensure the board are selected carefully (nomination committee), that they possess the right skills, education,
experience, be cultural and diverse.
Open: The make sure that the board is transparent, accountable and disclosure accurately and in a timely manner.
Auditor Independence: that accounts are audited by an independent auditor.
Remuneration of directors, the CEO and executive staff are reviewed, and supported by a smaller remuneration
committee to the satisfaction of shareholders.
Directors are selected for their ability to “add-value” to the strategic direction of the company, and the support of the
CEO. Directors performance should be reviewed annually and training and support provided to up-skill directors and
assist them to guide the company to success.
Shareholders: to be given importance (both majority and minority), that shareholders have a voice (vote) and are provided
timely and accurate information on the company whereas the other ‘Stakeholders’ should be managed in line with company
policy, in an ethical manner as part of risk minimization for the company.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is much debate as to whether there will ever be one set of governance standards
applicable to all businesses listed in various countries stock exchanges. This research
compares the governance standards across the globe, from China, to the Nordic region,
Europe, Asia-Pacific and the United States of America. The findings show that across
borders governance codes are very similar, but they have differences. This does not
diminish the need, indeed the ability, to capture the most common features of each to
create a Global Governance Standard (GGS), applicable to any business in all
countries. It could be known by the acronym BOARDSS (Board, Open, Auditor,
Remuneration, Directors, Shareholders and Stakeholder). Such a “one-size-fits-all”
GGS could potentially apply to any company listed on any stock exchange.
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